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Abstract
This paper studies household decisions about participation and investment in risky
…nancial markets, using a unique panel dataset of Italian households. Micro data show
that households are enormously heterogeneous in their …nancial decisions. Most of this
heterogeneity is associated with the choice of participating in risky …nancial markets,
and with time persistence in this decision. We postulate a model of portfolio choice
with two types of …nancial assets, risky and riskless, and costs of participation. We use
a ‡exible approach to estimate the conditional probability distribution function of the
household shares of risky assets. We …nd that both household the cash-on-hand/non-
…nancial-income ratio and non-…nancial-income have a positive e¤ect on the household
shares of risky …nancial assets, mainly due their in‡uence on the household likelihood
of participating in the risky …nancial assets. The evidence also shows that the lagged
household share of risky asset is an important determinant of the household choice.
Nevertheless, we …nd that the age of the household’s head has not statistical relevance.
JEL: G11, E21, C25, D12
Keywords: household portfolio, longitudinal data, discrete choice.
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comments.1 Introduction
During the past decade, …nancial markets have experienced important changes towards
greater internationalization, integration and coordination, …nancial liberalization, and prod-
uct innovation. Macro and micro data show that the structure of household wealth has
changed substantially in that decade. If we take into account the real assets, residential
property is still the single most important item in the aggregate household wealth. Nev-
ertheless, its share has been decreasing while the relative importance of …nancial asset has
increased substantially. Furthermore, there has been a rapid increase in the fraction of house-
holds owning equities, from 33 to 49 percent and from 12 to 22 percent in the U.S. and Italy
respectively between 1989 and 1998 (Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli, 2001). Similar patterns
of increased ownership of equities and other risky …nancial assets have occurred in many
nations around the world, suggesting that the quality of …nancial investment decisions made
by households will be of increasing importance to their future living standards (Ameriks and
Zeldes, 2000).
This paper provides an empirical analysis of household …nancial decisions about partic-
ipation and investment in the risky …nancial markets. We postulate a model of portfolio
choice with two types of …nancial assets, risky and safe and costs of participation. Based
upon a very general speci…cation for the agent decision rule, we develop a ‡exible econometric
approach that allows us to estimate the probability distribution function of the household
shares of risky assets conditional on some observable characteristics that are related with the
main state variables of the economic model (the cash-on-hand/non-…nancial-income ratio,
non-…nancial-income, age and previous investment in the risky assets).
The dependent variable, the household shares of risky assets, belongs to the unit interval
and accumulates some positive mass of probability at the (zero) corner solution. We make
use of these features and proceed to discretize the dependent variable in order to approximate
its conditional probability distribution function. The main discretization criterion we apply
is to include one discrete choice for the (zero) corner solution and to divide the remaining
space of the dependent variable among equal probability intervals. We determine how many
intervals to use by applying Likelihood Ratio Tests.
The data come from the Italian “Survey of Households Income and Wealth”, a unique
1data set which o¤ers longitudinal data on household wealth, income and consumption and
also includes detailed information about …nancial holdings and demographic characteristics
of households members. Moreover, its quality has proved to be good enough for our purposes.
Our …ndings suggest that household’s likelihood of participating in the risky asset mar-
kets is an increasing function of both the cash-on-hand/non-…nancial-income ratio and non-
…nancial-income. Furthemore, the age of the agent is not statistically relevant. Conditional
on participation, the expected value of household shares of risky assets is slightly increas-
ing with the cash-on-hand/non-…nancial-income ratio and non-…nancial-income but is not
a¤ected by age. Finally, previous participation in the risky asset markets increases signi…ca-
tively the probability of participation and the expected value of the household shares of the
risky assets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical economic background
and Section 3 brie‡y presents the empirical antecedents of this study. Section 4 explains our
econometric methodology and main characteristics of the data. Section 5 analyzes results
and Section 6 concludes.
2 Economic background
2.1 Theoretical literature on the policy rule
In the late sixties the seminal paper of Samuelson (1969) addressed the problem of consump-
tion and portfolio choice over the life cycle by establishing a very simple rule in order to
select the optimal portfolio. Assuming complete markets, independent and identically dis-
tributed returns, that household preferences can be represented by a power utility function
and there are no other sources of income except …nancial returns, Samuelson showed that
the sequence of portfolio structures that is statically optimal is also dynamically optimal.
The optimal share of risky assets is constant, independent of wealth and age, and could be
described as ®¤ =
¹
°¾2 , where ® is the risky asset share of household´s portfolio, ¹ and ¾2
are, respectively, the expectation and variance of the excess return, and ° is the coe¢cient
of relative risk aversion of the agent. Selection rule depends only on risk aversion, and the
moments of the asset´s excess return distribution; that is to say that myopia is optimal and
consequently life cycle patterns do not matter (Gollier, 2001).
2Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992) introduce the presence of labor income into the
picture and conclude that human capital could a¤ect the decision about investment in the
risky …nancial assets for two reasons: the uncertain and uninsurable nature of future labor
income streams and the ability of households to vary their labor supply in the future.
This issue appear to be also very important from an empirical point of view because most
of the observed volatility of households earnings comes from variations in labor incomes and
typically risks related to human capital cannot be traded. Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout
(1997) show that the optimality of myopia disappears as the complete markets assumption
is relaxed. These authors claim that the ratio of current wealth to expected future labor
income is a crucial determinant of consumption and portfolio choice. To the extent that this
ratio changes over the life cycle, the optimal portfolio allocation should not be expected to
be age invariant and myopia could not be optimal. Other e¤ects of labor income on portfolio
choice appear if labor income and asset returns are correlated, or if we allow for the existence
of time variation in the set of investment opportunities (Viceira, 2001).
Unfortunately, there is no known analytical solution to a portfolio life-cycle model that
includes a stochastic stream of labor income. In a seminal paper, Merton developed an
optimal rule allowing for the existence of a constant labor income pro…le. Cocco, Gomes and
Maenhout (1999) describe Merton’s rule and generalize it by allowing for variation in the





Wt is …nancial wealth and P DV (FYt) is the expected present discounted value of the future
labor income stream.
Viceira (2001) and Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (1999) solve numerically a life cycle
model using calibration techniques, this method allows them to simulate the individual op-
timal path for consumption and risky asset holdings under the assumption that household
receives an exogenous, uncertain and uninsurable stream of labor income. These authors
conclude that the demand for the risky asset increases in the presence of labor income and
that, conditional on a given future labor income stream, the optimal fraction to invest in the
risky asset is a decreasing function of current wealth. They also …nd that the shape of the
labor income pro…le over the life time ought to induce the investor to reduce the risky asset
share when aging.
Finally, there are some professional …nancial planners who often advise that the fraction
3of wealth that people ought to hold in the risky asset markets should decline with age. A
typical rule of thumb is that the percentage on an investor’s portfolio of …nancial assets that
is held in equities should equal 100 minus her age (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2000).
Note that the analyses brie‡y referred above focus on the interior solutions of the house-
hold investment problem. In order to …nd a theoretical explanation of the (zero) corner
solution in the demand for the risky assets we can refer to Deaton (1991). Deaton …nds that
in the presence of borrowing constraints, saving and asset accumulation is quite sensitive to
what consumers believe about the stochastic process generating their income. The author
also shows that when income follows a random walk, it turns out that those who wish to
borrow but cannot do so typically can do no better than consume their incomes, but he also
points out that this “rule of thumb” is not generally optimal in the presence of borrowing
constraints.
Borrowing restrictions could explain why some households do not accumulate wealth.
Moreover, we could expect that agents’ preferences and beliefs about both future non-
…nancial-income and future returns on …nancial investment play a crucial role in their de-
mand for the risky assets. Nevertheless, the combined e¤ect of borrowing restrictions and
…xed costs of participation in the risky asset markets is needed if we want to explain why
some households that own …nancial holdings decide not to participate in these markets.
2.2 The agent’s problem
The model considers the problem of a risk averse agent who derives utility from consumption,
that is to say, her goal is to maximize expected discounted utility over her remaining lifetime.
There are only two types of assets in the economy: human capital and …nancial assets. The
agent’s life horizon is in…nite but a positive probability of death makes her expected lifetime
to be …nite. There are no bequest motives.
At the beginning of period t the agent receives a liquid endowment. This endowment
consists of …nancial wealth (Wt) and non-…nancial-income (Yt).1 In the initial period of her
life, the agent receives certain amount of …nancial wealth as a present. That amount could be
greater than or equal to zero but unfortunately we cannot observe it. During the consecutive
periods …nancial wealth comes from the realized gross return of the investment made in the
1Non-…nancial-income could include labor income, pensions, returns of real assets and transfers.
4previous period. Non-…nancial-income follows a stochastic process that is determined by
agent’s human capital. We assume that both human capital and the respective labor supply
are exogenously given. Consequently the non-…nancial-income is also exogenous. In spite of
the fact there is no moral hazard in that context, we assume there are no insurance markets
for non-…nancial-income, thus the agent is not allowed to borrow.
At each period t; the agent simultaneously decides (i) how to allocate resources among
consumption and savings; and (ii) the demand for the risky asset as a fraction of her …nancial
holdings. There are two di¤erent …nancial assets in the economy. The expected return and
the volatility are greater for the risky asset than for the riskless one. Participation in the
riskless asset market is free but the agent has to pay some costs in order to participate in
the risky asset market. We assume a general costs function, that depends on both current
and previous household shares of risky assets.
The problem can be brie‡y described as follows. At each time period t; the agent observes
her income sources, the composition of her portfolio in the previous period and the set of
investment opportunities available in the market. Then, based on her preferences and beliefs
about future non-…nancial-income and asset returns, and taking into account the fact that
she is not permitted to borrow, the agent chooses her consumption expenditure (which also
determines …nancial holdings) and the proportion of …nancial holdings to allocate into the
risky asset. In order to select the optimal alternative the agent brings the future into the
picture and builds contingent plans of consumption and investment for her remaininglifetime.
We assume agent’s preferences are described by a standard, time separable, utility function
over consumption (u(C)).
Thus, agent’s problem in period t is to choose ct, the proportion of cash-on-hand to spend
on consumption (likewise, At wealth transferred to the next period) and ®t; the portion of
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Recall that Wt is accumulated …nancial wealth at the beginning of period t, Yt is non-
…nancial-income, at is the age of the agent, ct, is the proportion of cash on hand spent on
consumption, Ct is consumption expenditure, At is gross savings and ®t is the portion of the
…nancial wealth allocated in the risky asset. The agent is not allowed to borrow, thus both
the consumption rate and the risky asset share belong to the interval [0;1]. We assume that
the felicity function u() satis…es Inada conditions preventing the consumption rate to equal
zero. The subjective discount rate equals B; ( B 2 (0;1)) and ¸j (at) 2 (0;1) is a hazard
function that gives the probability of the agent to be alive at time t + j conditional on the
fact that she is alive and at years old at the beginning of period t. At the beginning of period
t the agent observes the amount of her …nancial wealth and non-…nancial-income, her age
and the previous pattern of participation in the risky asset market: There is uncertainty on
her future life status, on the future stream of non-…nancial-income fYt+jg;j > 0 and on the
future returns of the …nancial assets fRt+jg;j > 0. Finally, G(®t+j;®t+j¡1) captures the
costs that the agent should pay in order to participate in the risky asset market.
The solution to the problem can be described through Bellman’s principle of optimality,
V(st) = max
(ct; ®t)
u[(Wt + Yt) ct] + B¸(at)E [V (st+1)jst;ct; ®t] (1)
with,
E [V(st+1)jst;ct; ®t] =
Z
V (st+1)p(st+1jst;ct; ®t)
6st = [Wt + Yt;Yt;at;®t¡1;OTHERt]:
Under the additional assumption that the felicity function u(:) is homogenous we can re-








and, under the assumption that the non-…nancial-income process is exogenously given it is
possible to factorize the probability transitions,
Pr(st+1 j st;ct; ®t) = Pr(
Wt+1 + Yt+1
Yt
j st;ct; ®t;Yt+1) £ Pr(Yt+1 j Yt;at;OTHERt):
Note that the well de…ned state variables represent also a subset of the agent’s current
information that a¤ect her expectation about her remaining life-span, future non-…nancial
earnings, participation costs and asset returns and OTHER are the remaining variables that
in‡uence either probability transitions p(st+1jst;ct; ®t) or participation cost G(®t;®t¡1).
Given her expectations, at each period t; the agent’s sequential decision problem is to choose
values for the control variables (ct;®t) that maximize the expected discounted value of utility
over her remaining lifetime, where her expectations are conditioned on the current values of
the state variables st:























Several econometric issues arise in the empirical study of the household shares of risky assets.
First, the household shares of risky assets behaves like a limited dependent variable in the
sense that it belongs to the unit interval and accumulates a positive mass of probability at
zero. In order to deal with this issue most of the previous empirical analysis use models
2We are working on the solution of this model using numerical techniques (to our knowledge, there is not
any available analytical solution).
7that rely on the statistical structure of the Heckman selection model.3 A problem with this
approach is that the modelling of the probability distribution of the data is motivated by
assumptions about latent variables that lack of a natural interpretation in our context (c.f.
Aguirregabiria (1997) and Pakes (1994) for a discussion of the structural estimation of mixed
continuous discrete control variables).
Second, the expected relationship between the state variables and the dependent variable
is highly non-linear suggesting that a ‡exible framework is needed in order to capture the
true in‡uence of these variables over the household choice. Third, persistence could be due
to true state dependence or serial correlation in shocks. In principle, panel data allows one to
distinguish limited participation due to true state dependence from unobserved heterogeneity
as well as to handle serial correlation in shocks (see Arellano and Honoré (2001) for a general
survey and Miniaci and Weber (2001) for a speci…c discussion of modelling individual e¤ect in
the demand of risky …nancial assets). Finally, there is an identi…cation problem that prevents
unrestricted estimation of age, time and cohort e¤ects in longitudinal data.
3.2 Previous empirical …ndings
Micro data show that households are extraordinarily diverse in their …nancial portfolio choices
and that most of this heterogeneity is associated with the choice of whether to participate
in risky …nancial markets. Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2001) report that the proportion of
stockholders is lower than 50 percent in all countries (the highest proportion is 49 percent and
corresponds to the U.S.). On the other hand, welldocumented evidence demonstrates that the
expected returns on stocks and bonds are higher than that on bank deposits (Kocherlakota,
1996). In addition, there is evidence about time persistence in the decision to participate
in the risky …nancial asset markets. Data also show that many of those households that
own risky assets do not diversify these holdings. Life cycle patterns are also present when
analyzing actual data. In most countries, while there is a hump-shaped pro…le of the share of
ownership of the risky asset, conditional on owning them, the age pro…le of the share of the
risky asset in household …nancial portfolio is relatively ‡at (Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli,
2001).
Di¤erences in stockholdingacross countries are essentially due to di¤erences in the propen-
3See for example, the contributed chapters in Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (ed.), 2001.
8sity to hold stocks in the wealthier segments of the population. In the U.S. and the Nether-
lands the vast majority of households in the top 5 percent of the wealth distribution hold
some risky asset, while in Italy and Germany about a half of this class of investors has no
direct nor indirect stock holdings. This di¤erence is puzzling and could partly be attributed
to some combination of di¤erences in background risk and in informational and other entry
costs faced by these households. Heaton and Lucas (2000) stress that wealthy households
face considerable background risk through holdings of business wealth.
Guiso and Jappelli (2001) …nd that Italian household portfolio allocations depends basi-
cally on wealth. These authors show that the relative weight of …nancial assets in total asset
holdings declines with wealth, while that of investments into real estate and business equity
increases. They also show that wealthier households tend to invest a much larger share of
their wealth in risky assets and that there is a strong association between participation in
risky asset markets and wealth.
Ameriks and Zeldes (2000), Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2001) …nd that the proportion
of households participating in the risky asset markets exhibit a hump-shaped pro…le with
age, while equity shares conditional on ownership are nearly constant across age groups,
when they include only age and time e¤ects (excluding cohort e¤ects). Besides, Ameriks and
Zeldes (2000) address the identi…cation problem that prevents unrestricted estimation of age,
time and cohort e¤ects by showing that based on a speci…cation that includes age e¤ects and
cohort e¤ects (excluding time e¤ects) the risky asset share increases strongly with age.
Haliassos and Michaelidis (2001), Miniaci and Weber (2001), Perraudin and Sorensen
(2001) and Vissing-Jorgensen (1999) propose di¤erent approaches in order to introduce par-
ticipation costs in the …nancial risky assets demand. Vissing-Jorgensen (1999) …nds that the
lagged participation is a very strong predictor of the conditional probability of participating,
and concludes that the presence of …xed costs induces households to do nothing most of the
time and, occasionally, to make large portfolio adjustments.
4 Empirical analysis
The goal of the empirical analysis is to specify a reduced-form model for the conditional










The choice of the set of conditional variables is determined taking into account both
the expected sources of individual heterogeneity and the availability of information. The
economic model described in Section 2 implies that the cross-section variation of the vector
of the state variables is the primary source of heterogeneity on the household shares of
risky assets. Furthermore, other sources of individual heterogeneity could emerge from costs,
probability transitions and preferences.
Notice that …nancial wealth one period ahead is a linear transformation of the rate of
…nancial assets returns (Wt+1 = [At ¡ G(®t;®t¡1)] £ R(®)t+1). We could assume that the
probability distribution function of returns varies over time but is the same for all people;
however, for a given ®; its transformation may exhibit heterogeneity if participation costs
G(®t;®t¡1) vary among individuals. On the other hand, non-…nancial-income probability
transitions and parameters that characterize the felicity function are also expected to vary
with individual characteristics.
4.1 The data
The data are drawn from the Italian “Survey of Households’ Income and Wealth” (SHIW),
which is conducted by the Bank of Italy since 1965. From 1987, this unique dataset have a
panel structure, follows abiannualfrequency and includes extensive information on household
income, consumption and savings, asset holdings, real assets and other characteristics of the
household and its members. The data used in the estimation cover the years 1987 to 1998.4
The SHIW collects detailed information on the composition of Italian households …nan-
cial portfolio allowing constructing the dependent variable of the empirical model (®t). Since
the 1995 wave, portfolio data are collected using a frame that distinguishes 26 di¤erent …-
nancial assets. Previously (through 1989 and 1993) …nancial assets were split into only 13
types. This fact reduces the freedom to de…ne the …nancial assets categories. Taking into
account this fact and the characteristics of each type of …nancial asset we decided to classify
…nancial asset into four categories. We denominate the …rst one Deposits and it includes
4The SHIW has followed a biannual frequency since 1987 but the latest wave available (1998) took place
three years later than the previous one.
10bank current accounts, personal savings books, postal accounts and postal deposits. The
second category is called Stocks and comprehends investment funds shares, stocks of listed
companies, estate management and foreign assets. Bonds is the third category, containing
non-government bonds, certi…cates of deposit, repurchase agreements, postal saving certi…-
cates, interest bearing bonds, treasury bills, treasury certi…cates, long-term treasury bonds,
zero-coupon bonds and other government bonds. The last category is named Private Owner-
ship and includes shareholding-limited companies, shareholding-partnership and lending to
cooperatives. We distinguish the latest category from the other ones because we think that
the investment decision on this type of holdings follows very di¤erent rules than those on the
tradable …nancial assets.
The dependent variable is computed as the ratio of Stocks plus Bond over the sum of the
four categories. The panel structure of the SHIW allows us to construct the state variable
®t¡1 for those households with at least two observations. Household’s consumption and
…nancial holdings at the end of the year are also available and thus, we can evaluate the
cash on hand as the sum At + Ct. The SHIW includes information on labor income, real
assets yields, pensions and other transfers received by household’s members during the year,
these data allow us to obtain the aggregated non-…nancial-income of the household, which
corresponds to the state variable Yt: Finally, the age of the household head is also collected
by the Survey.
There are other observable characteristics that are expected to generate heterogeneity on
the households’ shares of the risky assets through their in‡uence over the cost of participation
in the risky asset markets, the non-…nancial-income probability transitions or the preferences
parameters. Thus, we complete the set of explanatory variables by adding the following ones:
the education level, the job and the industry of the head of the household head, the city and
the area of the household’s residence, the number of labor income earners, the family size
and a second order polynomial in time.
In addition, we avoid some other sources of heterogeneity by selecting those households
for which the head is male, older than 25 years old and married. We also eliminate those
observations with negative non-…nancial-income and improve the quality of the data by ex-
cluding those households with out of proportion changes on their asset holdings (more than
four deciles between two consecutive waves or two opposite sign changes greater than two
11deciles).
The sample contains 7823 observations. The proportion of household with risky …nancial
holding in the sample is 37 percent and attains 43 percent of the population with …nancial
holdings.
Table 1.b shows that themean values of both …nancial wealth and non-…nancial-incomeare
greater for those households that own risky …nancial assets. Moreover, we observe substantial
di¤erences on the proportion of households that have participated in the risky asset markets
in the previous period: the percent of participants in the previous period attains to 10, 17
and 66 percent for households without …nancial holdings, without risky …nancial holdings and
with risky …nancial holdings, respectively. On the contrary, small di¤erences are found on the
age of the household’s head between these groups. Finally, the family size is slightly smaller
for the group of risky asset owners while the number of labor income earners is greater.
Table 1.b also illustrates some other characteristics of the sample and shows that house-
holds with risky …nancial assets are highly educated and the majority of them reside in the
North of Italy. We also notice that independent workers are under represented within the
group of households who participate in the risky …nancial asset markets.
4.2 Econometric methodology
Taking advantage of the fact that the dependent variable belongs to the unit interval and
accumulates a positive mass of probability at zero, we propose to study its conditional prob-
ability distribution by using a discretization of the variable. As it will be shown below, this
approach allows us to capture potential non-linear e¤ects of the explanatory variables in a
relatively parsimonious way.
We proceed to discretize the dependent variable into J + 1 values as follows:
®it =
8
> > > > <










With 0 6 ®j < ®j = ®j+1 6 1;8j = 1;2;:::;J ¡ 1:
Let us de…ne djit = 1(®it = ®j) = 1(®¤
it 2 (®j;®j]).
12We have a sample (®it;X1it;X2it;:::;XKit); i = 1;2;::N; t = 1;:::Ti thus we can estimate










Fjit = Pr(djit = 1 j Xit):
We complete the model by selecting a multinomial logit speci…cation for Fj, and thus,




s=0 exp(±s + X0
it¯ s)
and normalize the model by …xing exp(±0 + X0
it¯0) = 1.
It is important to notice that this speci…cation allows coe¢cients to vary with the dif-
ferent discrete values of the dependent variable, and thus it captures the local e¤ect of the
explanatory variables on ®it in a ‡exible way.
Given the availability of panel data, the multinomial logit speci…cation allows us to deal
with the presence of individual speci…c e¤ects, provided we treat the X’s as strictly exogenous
variables and use the multinomial version of the conditional logit panel model discused by
Chamberlain (1980). In order to assess the relevance of correlated individual e¤ects in the
determination of ®¤
it we …rst estimated simplier linear models and found that the presence
of correlated individual e¤ects is not relevant in our case. These results are similar to those
of Guiso and Japelli (2001). Note that the conditional multinomial logit model restricts the
sample to the observations for which dij changes over time and identi…cation relies on the
time variation of the explanatory variables (Arellano and Honoré, 2001), which implies that
much information is lost (i.e., the e¤ect of characteristics that do not vary over time, such
as education) and other potential sources of estimation bias are ampli…ed (i.e., measurement
errors). Moreover, we are also interested in including lagged dependent variables among
the regressors and possibly treating other X’s as predetermined variables (i.e., the cash-on-
hand/non-…nancial-income ratio), which rule out strict exogeneity. Thus, we proceed on the
assumption that there are not correlated unobservable individual e¤ects in our model.
Furthermore, we have to decide which pair among age, time and cohort e¤ects must be
considered in the empirical speci…cation. Age in‡uences both the agent’s life horizon and
expectations on her future labour income stream. We also expect relevant variation on the
13participation costs and on the probability distribution of returns over time. On the other
hand, cohort e¤ects could be related with di¤erences on both preferences and the expected
duration of life. It seems a-priori that the size of these latest changes over a short period
is less important than those related with the age and time e¤ects. Thus, we disregard the
presence of cohort e¤ects and assume that there are only age and time e¤ects in our model .
In order to estimate the model we should decide both on the discretization criterion and
on the number of intervals to be used. Note that we de…ne ®j including one discrete choice
for the (zero) corner solution and dividing the remaining space of the dependent variable
among J intervals. In order to split this semi-open interval we consider two di¤erent criteria,
one is to produce equal probability grids and another is to generate equally spaced grids.
Below we present the log-Likelihood Ratio Test that allows us to decide about the number
of intervals of the discretization grid.
4.2.1 Likelihood Ratio Test for the selection of J
Consider the test on the choice of J = 2 with ®j ½ f®0;®1;®2g against J = 1 with ® ½
f®0;®1 [ ®2g: If J equals 2 the choice probabilities are given by:
p0 = Pr(d0 = 1 j X) =
1
1 + exp(±1 + X0¯1) + exp(±2 + X0¯ 2)
pj = Pr(dj = 1 j X) =
exp(±j + X0¯j)
1 + exp(±1 + X0¯1) + exp(±2 + X0¯2)
;j = 1;2
while if J equals 1;
p0 = Pr(d0 = 1 j X) =
1
1 + exp(±12 + X 0¯12)
p1+2 = Pr(d1 + d2 = 1 j X) =
exp(±12 + X0¯12)
1 + exp(±12 + X0¯ 12)
Let us consider the hypothesis H0 : ¯ 2 = ¯ 1(= ¯ 12); under H0 pj =
exp(±j+X 0¯1)
1+exp(°+X0¯1); j = 1;2
and p1 + p2 =
exp(°+X 0¯1)
1+exp(°+X 0¯1) with exp(°) = exp(±1) + exp(±2):
The log-likelihood of the unrestricted model (J = 2) is given by:







li(2) = d0ilogp0 + d1i logp1 + d2i logp2
14while if J = 1 the log-likelihood equals,







li(1) = d0ilogp0 + (d1i + d2i)logp1+2
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i d1i+d2i: Finally, the correspondent LR Test statistic
is de…ned by ¡2(L(1) + Le(1;2) ¡ L(2)) ~ {K:
It is easy to generalizetothe analoguediscretization problem of the dependent variable but
now testing agrid ®j ½ f0;®1;®2;::::®Jgagainst another one ®
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Let us consider the hypothesis H0 : ¯2s¡1 = ¯ 2s 8s = 1;:::;
J




















and thus, the LRT statistic is given by ¡2(L( J
2 ) + LE( J
2 ;J) ¡ L(J))~{K£ J
2
4.2.2 Parameters of interest
The main parameters of interest of our model are measures of the change in the conditional
probabilities of the household shares of risky assets to belong to a speci…c interval, Pr(®it =
®j j Xit); j = 0;1;:::J. Moreover, the model allows us to obtain Pr(®¤
it > 0 j Xit) the
household’s probability of participating in the risky …nancial markets; E(®¤
it j Xit); the
expected value of the household shares of risky assets and E(®¤
it j Xit;®¤
it > 0); the expected
value conditional on participation.
The conditional expected value of ®¤ equals
PJ
j=1 E(®¤
it j Xit;®it = ®j) Pr(®it = ®j j
Xit): Besides, the LR Test applied in order to decide the size of the grid has an appealing
interpretation: it implies that for the J ¡grid suggested by this procedure E(®¤
it j Xit;®it =
®j) = E(®¤
it j ®it = ®j) = E(®¤
it j ®¤
it 2 (®j;®j]), that is to say, the observable characteristics




it j Xit) =
J X
j=1
®j £ Pr(®it = ®j j Xit);
where ®j could be
P
i dij£®i P






it > 0) =
E(® j Xit)
1¡ Pr(®¤
j = 0 j Xit)
:
Furthermore, we are interested in the evaluation of elasticities with respect to the cash-on-
hand/non-…nancial-income ratio and non-…nancial-income and the model allow us to obtain















@ log Xitk where f(®¤
it;Xit) is Pr(®¤
it =
0 j Xit); E(®¤
it j Xit) and E(®¤
it j Xit;®¤
it > 0). Similarly, we can obtain the proportional










The LR Test proposed above in order to select the size of the grid suggests the discretization
of ® 2 (0;1] into 4 values if we use an equal probability grid, and into 8 values if the grid is
equally spaced. Thus, we decide to use an equal probability grid that splits the (0;1] interval
among the empirical quartiles of ®¤ j ®¤ > 0. Table 2 reports the values the tests under
equal probability grids.
Afterwards, we obtain the unconditional correlations between the observed dependent
variable (®¤
it) and the discretized one (®it), which attains 0.99, and between the …rst di¤er-
ences of each of these two variables (¢®¤
it and ¢®it); that is 0.98. These high correlations
suggest that the amount of information we lose in the discretization procedure is actually
not of relevance.
Table 3 reports coe¢cients and standard errors of the multinomial estimation of the
model. It is important to note that in order to apply the previous tests we do not include
the lagged dependent variable within the X-vector. This is because its de…nition changes
5Note that the model allows us to use other predictors of ®: The most obvious is to predict the conditional
median of ®: Furthermore, predictions of the expected value can be computed using a two step procedure; in
the …rst step the value of ® is …xed at zero for household with po greater than certain threshold and in the





16with the size of the grid introducing unnecessary complexity to the problem. Instead we use
an indicator variable that assumes the value of 1 whenever the lagged dependent variable
is di¤erent than zero. Once we have selected the size of the grid, we use a log-likelihood
ratio test for the hypothesis of including only the indicator variable against the alternative
of introducing the already properly de…ned lagged dependent variable. The result of the test
suggests us to consider this latter variable. Except for this fact, we use the same X-vector
for the LR tests on the size of the grid and for the estimation reported in Table 3.
The interpretation of the multinomial coe¢cients is not straightforward. However, there
are some conclusions that arise when we analyze them. First, we observe that the coe¢cients
on both the cash-on-hand/non-…nancial-income ratio and non-…nancial-income are positive,
signi…cant and higher the higher are the intervals of ®. Moreover, the coe¢cients of the square
of the former variable are negative and signi…cant, suggesting that its positive in‡uence is
decreasing. Secondly, we observe that age coe¢cients are not signi…cant.6Moreover, the
coe¢cients of the indicator variables that capture the value of the lagged dependent variable
are positive and signi…cant, showing that the probability of participating exhibit a relevant
increase if the household has participated in the risky asset markets in the previous period.
This fact could be thought as evidence of the existence of entry cost in the risky …nancial
asset markets. Besides, the coe¢cients of the second order polynomial in time show a positive
and concave trend over time. Finally, the estimation suggest that the amount of household
real wealth, the family size, the fact that the head was an independent worker and the
localization of the household in the South of Italy in‡uence negatively household’s probability
of participating in the risky …nancial markets.
In order obtain further results, we obtain the elasticity with respect to the cash-on-
hand/non-…nancial-income ratio, non-…nancial-income and the proportional e¤ect of the age
of the household’s head, evaluating the X ¡ vector on each sample individual value. Tables
4, 5 and 6 report the averages of these measures. We compute averages for the whole sample
and within di¤erent household groups, in order to investigate if the empirical elasticity´s
function is constant with respect to the variable it is referred to.
We …nd evidence that the probability of household to participate in the risky asset mar-
kets is positively in‡uenced by both the cash-on-hand/non-…nancial-income ratio and non-
6The square of income and age were included at …rst but they resulted not to be signi…cant.
17…nancial-income, but exhibits a negative slope with respect to the age of the household’s
head. The average elasticity with respect to the cash-on-hand/non-…nancial income ratio at-
tains 2.04; however, this e¤ect decreases as this variable increases and it is very low within the
top deciles of the cash-on-hand/non-…nancial-income distribution (Table 4). The elasticity
with respect to non-…nancial-income is also positive and decreasing with non-…nancial income
level, and its sample average equals 1.25 (Table 5). Besides, the model predicts that the age
of the household a¤ects negatively the probability of participating, although the average of
its proportional e¤ect is very small (-0.0031, see Table 6).
The expected value of the households shares of risky asset conditional on participation is
increasing with respect to the state variables previously referred, but elasticities are signi…ca-
tively lower. The average elasticities with respect to the cash-on-hand/non-…nancial-income
ratio and non-…nancial-income are 0.20 and 0.10 respectively, and the average of the pro-
portional e¤ect of age is 0.0005, showing that the relevance of age is also weak in this case.
Moreover, elasticity with respect to the cash-on-hand/non-…nancial-income ratiois decreasing
but seems to be invariant with respect to non-…nancial-income (Tables 4,5 and 6).
Finally, the in‡uence of these variables on the expected value of the household shares of
risky asset is dominated by their e¤ect on the probability of participating. The size of the
e¤ect is slightly enforced (w.r.t. the e¤ect on probability of participating) if the variables
of interest are cash-on-hand/non-…nancial-income ratio and non-…nancial income but it is
reduced in the case of age.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper proposes a ‡exible approach in order to estimate the probability distribution
function of the household shares of risky assets conditional on some households observable
characteristics that are related with the state variables of the model (the cash-on-hand/non-
…nancial-income ratio, non-…nancial-income, age and lagged shares of risky assets).
We postulate a model of portfolio choice with two …nancial assets, risky and safe, and
costs of participation. Using a unique panel data set of Italian households and a very gen-
eral speci…cation for the agent’s preferences and decision rules, we estimate this probability
function and use the predictions of the model in order to study the e¤ect of each of the state
18variables of the model on the probability distribution function of the risky asset share.
Our empirical approach relies on the discretization of the dependent variable taking ad-
vantage of the fact that it belongs to the unit interval and accumulate some positive mass of
probability at zero. This approach allows us to capture non-linear e¤ects of the explanatory
variables in a relatively parsimonious way. We apply Likelihood Ratio Tests in order to decide
both the discretization criterion and the number of intervals of the grid. This methodology,
suggests us to include one discrete choice for the (zero) corner solution and to divide the
remaining space of the dependent variable among four equal probability intervals. That grid
seems to capture most of the in‡uence of the explanatory variables on the households shares
of risky assets (and also a very high proportion of the unconditional cross-section variation
of this variable).
The main parameters of interest of our model are measures of the change in the conditional
probabilities of the household shares of risky assets. We evaluate the elasticity of both the
probability of participation and the expected value of the houshold shares of risky assets
with respect to the cash-on-hand/non-…nancial-income ratio and non-…nancial-income. Our
results show that both variables in‡uence positively the household shares of risky …nancial
assets. That in‡uence comes mainly from the positive e¤ect that both variables have on
the household probability of participating. Moreover, both variables tend to increase the
expected value of the shares of risky assets conditional on participation.
The e¤ect of the age of the household´s head is negative on the probability of participation
and positive on the expected value conditional on participation. The combination of these
two e¤ects seems to a¤ects negatively the expected value of the household shares of risky
assets. However, none of these e¤ects is statistically relevant.
Finally, the probability of participating exhibits a relevant increase if the household has
participated in the risky asset markets in the previous period. This fact could be thought as
evidence of the existence of entry costs in the risky …nancial markets.
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22Table 1: Sample Statistics
1.a Sample size
No. Obs. Proportion
Group I Households with zero …nancial holdings 1083 14
Group II Households with zero risky asset holdings 3823 49
Group III Households with positive risky asset holdings 2917 37
Total Sample 7823 100
1.b. Households’ characteristics
Variable Group I Group II Group III Total
Risky asset share (per unit)
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.24
Stand. dev. 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.35
Median 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.00
Financial Wealth at the end of the period (euros)
Mean 0 9392 46096 21777
Stand. dev. 0 37467 76842 56995
Median 0 4652 24359 6940
Non Financial Income (euros)
Mean 16604 23324 31870 25580
Stand. dev. 11431 13527 18866 16388
Median 14022 20340 28430 22207
Real Wealth at the end of the period (euros)
Mean 63905 113014 191742 135571
Stand. dev. 133074 192769 293323 234132
Median 32279 72336 127941 83149
Consumption (euros)
Mean 13563 17594 22882 19008
Stand. dev. 7599 9069 12853 10975
Median 11893 15605 20355 16512
23Table 1: (continuation)
Variable Group I Group II Group III Total
Age of household’s head (years)
Mean 53.7 52.1 53.2 52.7
Stand. dev. 13.7 13.1 12.5 13.0
Median 54.0 51.0 53.0 52.0
Previous participation in the risky asset markets
% of hh that participated 10.2 17.1 66.3 35.2
Family Size (# of members)
Mean 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.5
Stand. dev. 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.1
Median 4.0 4.0 3.0 4.0
Number of labour income earners
Mean 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.3
Stand. dev. 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
Median 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Education (% of hh by education of the head)
Less than elementary 13.1 5.7 1.7 5.3
Elementary school 45.5 32.2 22.7 30.4
Middle school 27.5 32.6 28.9 30.5
High school 11.3 23.5 33.1 25.4
More than high school 2.7 6.0 13.5 8.4
Independent Worker
(% of hh by head´s job)
14.4 17.7 15.6 16.5
Resident in the South
(% of hh by localization)
71.0 45.6 25.0 41.4
City size (% of hh by city of residence)
5.000 to 20.000 15.6 14.3 13.8 14.3
20.000 to 50.000 26.9 28.7 27.4 28.0
50.000 to 200.000 33.8 34.6 34.1 34.3
More than 200.000 15.8 13.6 16.8 15.1
24Table 2: LR Test on the Size of the Grid
Statistic value D. of freedom p-value
2 versus 1 cells 280.6 20 0.00
4 versus 2 cells 179.7 40 0.00
8 versus 4 cells 97.6 80 0.09
Table 3: Multinomial Logit Estimation
®1 ®2 ®3 ®4
Age -0.008 0.000 -0.005 -0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Non-…nancial Income (log) 1.717 2.051 2.172 2.510
(0.140) (0.139) (0.143) (0.162)
Cash on Hand/NFI (log) 2.773 3.300 4.091 4.296
(0.153) (0.177) (0.188) (0.209)
CoH/NFI (log) Square -5.961 -8.071 -10.850 -8.768
(0.836) (1.078) (1.131) (0.905)
I(®t¡1 = ®1) 1.726 1.845 1.259 1.298
(0.133) (0.143) (0.170) (0.187)
I(®t¡1 = ®2) 1.133 1.593 1.814 1.433
(0.150) (0.139) (0.143) (0.167)
I(®t¡1 = ®3) 1.338 1.833 2.181 2.014
(0.161) (0.153) (0.153) (0.164)
I(®t¡1 = ®4) 1.103 1.580 2.002 2.456
(0.171) (0.169) (0.158) (0.159)
Real Wealth -0.254 -0.485 -0.379 -0.504
(0.151) (0.156) (0.162) (0.165)
Family Size -0.422 -0.498 -0.385 -0.377
(0.162) (0.173) (0.171) (0.192)
No. labour income earners 0.159 -0.005 -0.038 -0.160
(0.068) (0.072) (0.076) (0.082)
Independent Worker -0.103 -0.486 -0.502 -0.993
(0.123) (0.140) (0.144) (0.175)
Time 0.415 1.161 1.579 2.432
(0.240) (0.251) (0.281) (0.322)
Time Square -0.044 -0.139 -0.192 -0.281
(0.028) (0.030) (0.033) (0.037)
Resident in the South 0.002 -0.150 -0.344 -0.319
(0.103) (0.108) (0.119) (0.126)
Constant -20.061 -26.081 -27.634 -32.448
(1.482) (1.480) (1.558) (1.781)
Notes:
1) Dummies on the education of the head and the city of residence were also considered.
2) Number in parentheses are standard errors.
25Table 4: Elasticities w.r.t. the ratio Cash on Hand-Non-…nancial Income
Sample Averages, by percentil of CoH/NFI ratio
Pr(® j Xi) E(® j Xi) E(® j Xi;® > 0)
Total
Mean 2.04 2.24 0.20
Stdan. dev. 1.26 1.32 0.07
Quintil 1
Mean 3.41 3.70 0.28
Stdan. dev. 0.57 0.58 0.04
Quintil 2
Mean 2.78 3.03 0.25
Stdan. dev. 0.67 0.68 0.03
Quintil 3
Mean 2.26 2.48 0.22
Stdan. dev. 0.77 0.79 0.03
Quintil 4
Mean 1.49 1.67 0.18
Stdan. dev. 0.85 0.87 0.03
Decil 9
Mean 0.74 0.87 0.13
Stdan. dev. 0.65 0.67 0.03
Decil 10
Mean 0.21 0.29 0.07
Stdan. dev. 0.38 0.40 0.04
Table 5: Elasticities w.r.t. Non-…nancial Income
Sample Averages, by percentil of NFI
Pr(® > 0 j Xi) E(® j Xi) E(® j Xi;® > 0)
Total
Mean 1.25 1.35 0.10
Stdan. dev. 0.65 0.66 0.02
Quintil 1
Mean 1.73 1.84 0.11
Stdan. dev. 0.33 0.34 0.02
Quintil 2
Mean 1.49 1.59 0.10
Stdan. dev. 0.53 0.54 0.02
Quintil 3
Mean 1.27 1.37 0.10
Stdan. dev. 0.60 0.61 0.02
Quintil 4
Mean 1.08 1.18 0.10
Stdan. dev. 0.64 0.65 0.02
Decil 9
Mean 0.91 1.01 0.10
Stdan. dev. 0.64 0.66 0.02
Decil 10
Mean 0.67 0.76 0.10
Stdan. dev. 0.63 0.64 0.02
26Table 6: Proportional e¤ects w.r.t. Age of HH’s Head
Sample Averages, by Age Groups
Pr(® > 0 j Xi) E(® j Xi) E(® j Xi;® > 0)
Total
Mean -0.0031 -0.0025 0.0005
Stdan. dev. 0.0018 0.0015 0.0003
Less than 40 years old
Mean -0.0034 -0.0028 0.0006
Stdan. dev. 0.0017 0.0015 0.0003
40-50 years old
Mean -0.0032 -0.0026 0.0006
Stdan. dev. 0.0017 0.0015 0.0003
50-60 years old
Mean -0.0029 -0.0024 0.0005
Stdan. dev. 0.0018 0.0016 0.0003
60-70 years old
Mean -0.0029 -0.0024 0.0004
Stdan. dev. 0.0018 0.0016 0.0003
More than 80 years old
Mean -0.0030 -0.0026 0.0004
Stdan. dev. 0.0018 0.0015 0.0003
27